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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
KINGS COUNTY
People v. Adbul-Akim'
(decided May 6, 2010)
Ali Abdul-Akim and Marcus Ayala were charged with
criminal possession of a weapon following the recovery of a firearm
during a search of defendant Ayala's vehicle.2 The defendants
moved to suppress the firearm claiming that defendant Ayala's arrest
for unlicensed driving and illegal use of a cell phone was not
supported by probable cause and, as a result, the firearm seized
following his arrest was illegally obtained.3 After holding a
Mapp/Dunaway hearing, the court granted the defendants' motion to
suppress the firearm.4 It determined "that the arrests of the
defendants and the [subsequent] inventory search of defendant
Ayala's [vehicle] were not legal" because the actions by the law
enforcement officers were unreasonable and not supported by
probable cause.' Specifically, the court determined that the police
conduct in this case violated Ayala's rightS6 under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution' and article I, section
12 of the New York Constitution.8 More importantly, the court
determined that even if probable cause had existed in this case,
' No. 5518/09, 2010 WL 1856007 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 6,2010).
2 Id. at *1. "Defendant Abdul-Akim w[as] also charged with Unlawful Wearing of a
Body Vest." Id.
3 Id. Defendant Abdul-Akim also moved to suppress the body vest. Id.
4 Abdul-Akim, 2010 WL 1856007, at *12. The court also granted Abdul-Akim's motion
and suppressed the body vest. Id.
Id.
6 Id. at *9.
7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ."
8 Article 1, section 12 of the New York State Constitution states, in relevant part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ."
587
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Ayala's arrest for the cell phone infraction was unwarranted and a
violation of his constitutional rights.9
On June 16, 2009, Officer Armenio, while on foot patrol,
observed defendant Ayala "holding a cell phone with both hands"
while operating a vehicle.'o After directing him to pull over, Officer
Armenio asked Ayala for his driver's license, registration, and proof
of insurance." Ayala complied with this request and produced a
Virginia "permit" together with registration and insurance
documents.12  After examining the "permit," Officer Armenio
"determined at the scene that the document was not a driver's license
and arrested defendant Ayala for unlicensed driving, as well as for
operating a motor vehicle while unlawfully using a cell phone." 3 As
he was being arrested, Ayala requested that the officers verify the
validity of the Virginia license; however, the officer told Ayala that
nothing was found in the database.14 Following the arrest, Ayala's
vehicle was seized and transferred "to the precinct for inventory and
safekeeping."" During the inventory search, "a loaded nine
millimeter firearm and one loose nine millimeter round" were
discovered. 6
At the Mapp/Dunaway hearing, Ayala testified that he was
issued a temporary license from the Virginia Department of Motor
Vehicles the day prior to his arrest.' 7 He was informed by the
Department of Motor Vehicles that he would receive his actual
license in the mail within one week.' 8 The defense offered Ayala's
Virginia temporary driving permit into evidence, which was issued in
February 2010.' This document was "identical" to the temporary
9 Abdul-Akim, 2010 WL 1856007, at *l1.
Io Id. at *1. Defendant Abdul-Akim and an acquaintance, Jeffrey Brown, were also in
Ayala's vehicle. Id. At some point during the stop, Brown produced a valid New York State
driver's license at the request of Officer Armenio. Id at *2.
' Id. at *1.
12 Abdul-Akim, 2010 WL 1856007, at *1.
13 Id While Officer Armenio was questioning Ayala, he witnessed defendant Abdul-
Akim exit Ayala's vehicle. Id. at *2. Subsequently, two officers on foot patrol stopped,
searched, and arrested Abdul-Akim for the unlawful wearing of a body vest. Id.
14 Id. at *3




19 Id Ayala received this temporary driving permit in February 2010 after he lost his
[Vol. 27588
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driving permit he presented to Officer Armenio on June 16, 2009,
"with the exception of the issue date." 20  The top center of the
document contained the words " 'Commonwealth of Virginia
Temporary Driving Permit.' ,21 Just below these words, Ayala's
22license type indicated that he was, in fact, a licensed driver.
Moreover, the defense offered a transcript of Ayala's driving record
into evidence which confirmed that Ayala was properly licensed as of
June 15, 2009.23
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the court
made two findings of fact in determining the defendants' motion to
suppress the evidence seized from Ayala's vehicle.24 First, the court
determined that Ayala's arrest for unlicensed driving was factually
unwarranted.25 Relying on the evidence proffered by the defense, the
court determined that Ayala furnished a valid driver's license despite
the fact that the word "permit" was displayed on it. 26 Notably, the
Virginia statute governing the issuance of temporary permits provides
that a temporary driving permit is valid "until the holder is issued a
driver's license." 27  Furthermore, based upon the documentary
evidence offered by the defense, there was "no indication that
Virginia ever issued defendant Ayala a learner's permit. There thus
[wa]s every reason to believe that what Officer Armenio saw on June
16, 2009 was a driver's license."28 Second, the court found that
defendant Ayala's arrest for the unlawful use of a cell phone was not
driver's license. Abdul-Akim, 2010 WL 1856007, at *3. Again, as in June 2009, Ayala "was
issued La] temporary license and [was] told to use it as a driver's license and to carry photo
ID along with it" until he received his photo license in the mail. Id Because Ayala "never
received the [2009] Virginia document back from the police[,]" Ayala offered the February
2010 document into evidence as a substitute for the document he presented to Officer
Armenio on June 16, 2009. Id
20 Id. The temporary license Ayala handed to Officer Armenio indicated June 15, 2009 as
the issue date. Id.
21 Abdul-Akim, 2010 WL 1856007, at *3.
22 Id. "Apparently both a Virginia temporary license and a Virginia temporary learner's
permit are headed 'Temporary Driving Permit.' " Id. at *8. "But the 'type' of authorization
granted .. . is plainly specified." Id.
23 Id. at *4.




28 Id. at *5 ("No other circumstance provides a reasonable basis for concluding that
Officer Armenio was instead shown a 'learner's permit.' ").
2011] 589
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supported by the evidence. 29 Although Officer Armenio testified that
he witnessed Ayala with a cell phone in his hands as he was driving
his car, the Vehicle and Traffic Law, at the time of defendant Ayala's
arrest, "prohibit[ed] a driver's use of a cell phone while [the] car is in
motion, but only if the cell phone is near the driver's ear."30
Therefore, since Armenio's testimony indicated that Ayala was most
likely texting, which was not a traffic violation at that time, Ayala's
use of the cell phone did not violate the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
Based upon these findings of fact, the court granted the
defendants' motion to suppress the firearm obtained from the search
of Ayala's vehicle.32 Foremost, the court concluded that defendant
Ayala's arrest violated his constitutional rights. A driver may be
stopped and questioned by a law enforcement officer only "where the
officer has probable cause to believe . . . the driver violated the
Vehicle and Traffic Law." 34  Since Ayala was not violating the
Vehicle and Traffic Law by using his cell phone, Officer Armenio
should never have stopped Ayala or asked him to produce his
license.3' Despite this conclusion, the court continued to analyze the
legality of the arrest based upon Officer Armenio's belief that Ayala
was operating a vehicle without a proper license. In deciding this
issue, the inquiry was whether Officer Armenio's mistaken belief that
Ayala presented an invalid license resulted from a mistake of fact or a
mistake of law.3
[S]hould an officer make an illegal arrest based on a
mistake of law and as a result recover evidence, the
29 Abdul-Akim, 2010 WL 1856007, at *5.
30 Id. Section 1225-d of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was enacted in late 2009, after
defendant Ayala's arrest, to prohibit the use of a cell phone while the car is in motion
regardless of whether the phone is near the driver's ear. Id
31 Id. at *5-6. In addition to Officer Armenio's testimony, the court relied on defendant
Ayala's testimony that "he did not use his cell phone while driving" in making its
determination. Id. at *6.
32 Abdul-Akim, 2010 WL 1856007, at *12.
3 Id. at *9.
34 Id. at *6 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); People v. Robinson, 767
N.E.2d 638, 642 (N.Y. 2001)).
3 Id. ("The court . . . concludes that defendant Ayala's cell phone use provided no
justification for a stop, in that there was no evidence that defendant Ayala was using his cell
phone illegally.").
36 Id.
n Abdul-Akim, 2010 WL 1856007, at *6.
[Vol. 27590
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evidence must be suppressed[;] [b]ut generally, if the
reason for an illegal arrest is a mistake about the facts
supporting the officer's belief that probable cause
exists, the arrest is not unlawful.3 8
Recognizing that Officer Armenio's mistake could be
classified as either a mistake of law or a mistake of fact, the court
"assume[d], in the People's favor, that in examining defendant's
license Officer Armenio made a mistake of fact." 39 Where a mistake
is one of fact, an otherwise unlawful arrest will be upheld only where
it is determined that the mistake was reasonable under the
circumstances. 40  Based upon the evidence, Officer Armenio's
mistaken belief that Ayala was an unlicensed driver did not meet this
standard.4 ' As previously noted, the license explicitly indicated that
Ayala was a licensed driver.42  Moreover, in view of the fact that
Ayala furnished valid registration and insurance papers, Officer
Armenio should have further researched the matter.43 A simple
inquiry into the status of Ayala's license would have revealed that he
was fully licensed." Therefore, "[tihe arrest [based upon the
unlicensed operation of a vehicle] was simply illegal, and it follows
that the seizure of defendant Ayala's car and the recovery of the
firearm from the glove box were actions taken in violation of
defendant Ayala's state and federal constitutional rights."45
Although the court concluded that Ayala's arrest for
unlawfully using a cell phone was factually unwarranted, it
proceeded to analyze the legality of a search incident to an arrest for
a mere traffic violation.46 Pursuant to the Vehicle and Traffic Law,
38 Id. (" 'The constitutional validity of a stop is not undermined simply because the
officers who made the stop were mistaken about relevant facts[.]' " (quoting United States v.
Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 2006))).
39 Id. at *7.
4 Id ("[lIt has been held that intrusive action may be justified by a 'reasonable' mistake
of fact.").
41 Id at *8.
42 Abdul-Akim, 2010 WL 1856007, at *8 ("[T]he court cannot ratify as 'reasonable' police
conduct based on obliviousness to the plain facial contents of a license.").
43 id
4 Id at *8-9 ("[T]he resources available to the police to determine the status of a driver
should have enabled the police to confirm the validity of defendant Ayala's driver's license
at the scene, obviating any need to transport defendant and his vehicle to the station house.").
45 Id. at 9.
4 Id. ("[T]he record does not permit the court to conclude that defendant Ayala could be
2011] 591
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an individual who unlawfully uses a cell phone while driving may be
fined no more than one hundred dollars.47 Although this act is
defined as a mere "traffic infraction" for which a "jail term is not
authorized," the governing statutes permit a police officer to execute
a warrantless arrest for this offense.48 Of course, a police officer
may, as an alternative to making a warrantless arrest, issue a
summons. 49  Although an arrest based upon a traffic infraction is
statutorily permitted, the arrest must nonetheless be reasonable under
the circumstances in order to prevail against a constitutional claim.so
Relying on this standard, the court determined that the "arrest of
defendant Ayala for unlawful cell phone use, with the ensuing seizure
of his automobile and the inventory of its contents, w[as] simply not
. . . reasonable."" A number of facts contributed to this conclusion. 52
Foremost, Officer Armenio should have issued a citation for the
alleged cell phone violation given the fact that Ayala produced
"numerous items of identification."53 Second, the officer had the
option of allowing Brown, one of the licensed passengers in the
vehicle, to drive Ayala's car.54 Finally, not only was the decision to
make an arrest in this situation unreasonable, but it was also followed
by the unnecessary seizure and inventory search of Ayala's vehicle. "
In sum, the police officers' conduct was not reasonable under
arrested for unlawfully using a cell phone while driving. But if that conclusion is wrong,
even a legal arrest for the cell phone offense would not have made the recovery of the
firearm . .. proper").
4' Abdul-Akim, 2010 WL 1856007, at *9.
48 Id. at *8. "The Vehicle and Traffic Law and the Criminal Procedure Law provide that a
warrantless arrest may be made for [unlawfully using a cell phone while driving]." Id. at *9.
More specifically, pursuant to the Vehicle and Traffic Law, " '[fjor the purposes of arrest
without a warrant, . . . a traffic infraction . . . [is] deemed an offense.' " Id at *9 n.9. The
Criminal Procedure Law permits an officer to arrest an individual for any offense so long as
the arrest is supported by probable cause. Id.
49 Abdul-Akim, 2010 WL 1856007, at *9 ("[A]n officer may issue an appearance ticket in
lieu of making a warrantless arrest.").
50 Id. ("[R]easonableness of police conduct is the key consideration in analyzing [police]
conduct under the Fourth Amendment and . . . Article I § 12 of the [New York]
[C]onstitution.").
s1 Id. ("Even though the arrest was authorized by statute, the disproportionate nature of
the police response to a supposed cell phone violation is apparent.").
52 See id at *10.
s3 Id ("Issuance of a citation was eminently practicable, for defendant Ayala had
numerous items of identification-and, of course, a valid license.").
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the circumstances, and therefore, the state and federal constitutional
rights of the defendants were violated once Ayala's arrest occurred.56
Since Ayala's arrest for the cell phone infraction and unlicensed
driving offense was not warranted, the search of the vehicle was
unconstitutional.5 7  Moreover, "even if [there had been] probable
cause to believe that defendant Ayala drove his car while unlawfully
using a cell phone, that was not a valid predicate for the resultant
arrest, search of the car, and recovery of the firearm."ss
The United States Supreme Court has addressed whether an
arrest for a traffic infraction violates an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights. 59 In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,60 Gail
Atwater was arrested for, and ultimately charged with, "driving
without her seatbelt fastened, failing to secure her children in
seatbelts, driving without a license, and failing to provide proof of
insurance" after a police officer observed her driving while not
wearing a seatbelt. 61 The applicable law authorized the police officer
to either issue a citation or make an arrest for the seatbelt violation.62
Atwater filed a § 1983 lawsuit against the City of Lago Vista
alleging a violation of her Fourth Amendment right against
63unreasonable seizure. In interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the
reviewing court must consider " 'the traditional protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law at
the time of the framing.' "6 Atwater first contended that the
common law prohibited warrantless arrests for misdemeanor offenses
unless such arrest was for breach of the peace. 65 The Court rejected
this argument, finding that it was neither supported by precedent nor
the historical record.66 Moreover, the history surrounding the
development of the Fourth Amendment did not support Atwater's
56 Id at *9.
s7 Id
5 Id. at *11.
5 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001).
60 Id. at 318.
6 Id at 324.
62 Id at 323.
63 Id. at 325.
6 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 326 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995)).
6s Id. at 326-27.
6 Id. at 332 ("We thus find disagreement, not unanimity, among both the common-law
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argument.6 7  In fact, "[d]uring the period leading up to and
surrounding the framing of the Bill of Rights, colonial and state
legislatures . . . regularly authorized local peace officers to make
warrantless misdemeanor arrests without conditioning statutory
authority on breach of the peace.",6  Thus, the Fourth Amendment
did not prevent peace officers from making warrantless arrests for
misdemeanors not based on breach of the peace.6 9  Furthermore,
there has been "two centuries of uninterrupted (and largely
unchallenged) state and federal practice permitting warrantless arrests
for misdemeanors not amounting to or involving breach of the
peace."70 Notably, "statutes in all [fifty] [s]tates and the District of
Columbia permit warrantless misdemeanor arrests by at least some (if
not all) peace officers without requiring any breach of the peace, as
do a host of congressional enactments." 71
Declining to adopt "a modem arrest rule," the Court
concluded that Atwater's arrest was lawful under the Fourth
Amendment. 72  After the police officer observed Atwater and her
children without seatbelts on, he was permitted, though not required,
to arrest her.73 Moreover, the arrest was not "made in an
'extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to her privacy or physical
interests.' "74
It is important to note, as did the court in Abdul-Akim, that the
Supreme Court's decision in Atwater was limited to the issue of
whether an arrest for a minor traffic offense was lawful under the
United States Constitution and did not involve the more specific
situation involving a search of a vehicle subsequent to an arrest for a
67 Id at 336. In addition to analyzing the common law, the Court also examined
"specifically American evidence." Id. However, "[n]either the history of the framing era
nor subsequent legal development indicates that the Fourth Amendment was originally
understood, or has traditionally been read, to embrace Atwater's position." Atwater, 532
U.S. at 322.
68 Id. at 337 (internal citations omitted).
69 Id. at 340 ("[Tlhe Fourth Amendment, as originally understood, [did not forbid] peace
officers to arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors not amounting to or involving breach
of the peace.").
70 Id.
71 Id. at 344.
72 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346, 354 (reaffirming that "[i]f an officer has probable cause to
believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence,
he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender").
" Id. at 354.
74 Id. (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).
594 [Vol. 27
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traffic infraction.
In Virginia v. Moore,76 the Supreme Court was presented with
the issue of whether an arrest for driving with a suspended license
and a subsequent search of the arrestee's person violated the Fourth
Amendment when the applicable state law required the officer to
issue a summons." David Lee Moore was arrested for driving with a
suspended license and was subsequently searched.7 ' The arresting
officers recovered cocaine from Moore's person and charged him
with possession and intent to distribute.79 Moore moved to "suppress
the evidence from the arrest search," arguing that because the arrest
was illegal under state law, the search following that arrest was also
unlawful.80 However, the Court rejected Moore's claim.'
7 See Abdul-Akim, 2010 WL 1856007, at *11; Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323. Although
Atwater did not involve a search, a number of Supreme Court decisions have clarified when
a search incident to an arrest is constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129
S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). A law
enforcement officer may conduct a search of a person where that person has been subjected
to a lawful arrest. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 ("[I]n the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full
search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment."). Recently, the Court
provided clarification as to when a search of a vehicle may be conducted following an
occupant's arrest. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. First, in Gant, the Court held that law
enforcement officers are authorized "to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest
only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search." Id. This means, therefore, that a police officer
cannot automatically conduct a search of a vehicle every time an occupant of a vehicle is
arrested. Id. Second, the Court concluded that "circumstances unique to the vehicle context
justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is 'reasonable to believe evidence relevant
to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.' " Id. (quoting Thornton v. United
States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004)). Notably, the Court acknowledged that "[iun many cases,
as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis
to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence." Id. However, it is important to note that
this decision placed restrictions on police officers' ability to conduct a warrantless search of
a vehicle incident to an arrest. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. Gant did not affect the holding of
South Dakota v. Opperman, wherein the Court held that warrantless inventory searches of
vehicles that have been impounded are constitutional. 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976). In
Oppernan, the Court held that "inventories pursuant to standard police procedures are
reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 372-73 (noting that the "Court has
consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful
police custody where the process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents").
6 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
n Id. at 166-67.
78 Id
7 Id. at 167.
so Id. at 167-68.
81 Moore, 553 U.S. at 178.
9
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At the outset, the Court addressed the issue of the arrest based
upon the misdemeanor traffic violation, stating that "when an officer
has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime
in his presence, . . . [t]he arrest is constitutionally reasonable."8 2 The
Court then addressed the issue of Virginia's law requiring an officer
to issue a summons for a traffic violation and recognized that a
"[s]tate is free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy among the
range of constitutionally permissible options, but its choice of a more
restrictive option does not render the less restrictive ones
unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional." 83 Next, Moore asserted
that even if the arrest was constitutionally permissible, the subsequent
search of his person was not.84 This argument was rejected, as it has
long been "recognized . . . that officers may perform searches
incident to constitutionally permissible arrests in order to ensure their
safety and safeguard evidence."8 ' After the officers placed Moore
under arrest, a search was justified in order to protect the officers
from harm.86 Put simply, "When officers have probable cause to
believe that a person has committed a crime in their presence, the
Fourth Amendment permits them to make an arrest, and to search the
suspect in order to safeguard evidence and ensure their safety."87
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
reinforced the principle that an arrest for a traffic violation does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.8 8 In Lockett v. New Orleans City,89
Shawn Lockett sued the City of New Orleans for false arrest after he
was pulled over for speeding and subsequently frisked and arrested
for reckless driving.90 The Fifth Circuit rejected Lockett's claim for
false arrest, finding that "because the [police officers] had probable
cause to believe that Lockett had been driving in violation of the
speed limit, the arrest did not violate a clearly established
82 Id. at 171 (citing Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354).
8 Id. at 174.
8 Id. at 176.
8s Id. at 176-77 (" 'A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification.' " (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235)).
86 Moore, 553 U.S. at 177 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235) ("The interests justifying
search are present whenever an officer makes an arrest.").
87 Id. at 178.
88 See Lockett v. New Orleans City, 607 F.3d 992, 998 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
9 Id. at 992.
9 Id. at 995-97.
596 [Vol. 27
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constitutional right." 91 Moreover, the holding set forth in United
States v. Robinson92 was utilized in rejecting Lockett's claim that he
was subjected to an illegal search. 93
Under federal case law, it is clear that if probable cause exists
to believe that a person has committed an offense, then an arrest of
that person is constitutionally permissible. This is true even where
the offense committed is minor, such as speeding or failing to stop at
a stop sign. Furthermore, a search incident to that arrest is reasonable
and will not violate the Fourth Amendment.
The New York courts have taken a position contrary to that of
the federal courts.94 In People v. Marsh,95 the New York Court of
Appeals suppressed evidence obtained from a search following an
arrest based upon an outstanding warrant. 96 The defendant's person
was searched after he was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant for a
prior speeding offense. 97 Subsequently, the defendant was "charged,
tried and convicted for possession of a policy slip."98
Although it is generally disfavored, a police officer is
statutorily permitted to make an arrest for a traffic violation.99
However, despite this authorization afforded to law enforcement,
"The authority of the police to search a traveler on the highway may
not be made to turn on whether the officer, [i]n the exercise of his
discretion, forthwith arrests the traffic offender instead of merely
summoning him to court." 00 Furthermore, even though an officer
may conduct a search incident to a lawful arrest,
[T]he [New York State] Legislature never intended to
authorize a search of a traffic offender unless, when
the vehicle is stopped, there are reasonable grounds
9' Id. at 998.
92 414 U.S. 218.
" Lockett, 607 F.3d at 1001.
9 People v. Abdul-Akim, No. 5518/09, 2010 WL 1856007, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 6,
2010) ("The New York Court of Appeals has on several occasions addressed the question of
custodial arrests for minor traffic infractions in the context of examining the legality of
searches incident to such arrests, and has expressed a preference for the issuance of an
appearance ticket in lieu of arrest.").
9 228 N.E.2d 783 (N.Y. 1967).
96 Id. at 787.
9 Id at 785.
9 Id
9 Id
'" Marsh, 228 N.E.2d at 785.
5972011]
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for suspecting that the officer is in danger or there is
probable cause for believing that the offender is guilty
of a crime rather than merely a simple traffic
infraction. 1o
This is because "A motorist who exceeds the speed limit does not
thereby indicate any propensity for violence or iniquity, and the
officer who stops the speeder has not even the slightest cause for
thinking that he is in danger of being assaulted."l 0 2
In sum, the court concluded that
[N]o search for a weapon is authorized as incident to
an arrest for a traffic infraction, regardless of whether
the arrest is made on the scene or pursuant to a
warrant, unless the officer has reason to fear an assault
or probable cause for believing that his prisoner has
committed a crime.
To hold otherwise "would preclude consideration of the
reasonableness of any particular search, and so would take away the
protection that the [C]onstitution is designed to provide."'0
Seven years later, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a
search following an arrest for driving without a valid license.'0o In
People v. Troiano,106 the defendant was arrested based on an arrest
warrant for "the misdemeanor charge of driving while licensed
suspended." 0 7  After the arresting police officer searched the
defendant's person, he found a loaded revolver in the waistband of
the defendant's pants. 08 The New York Court of Appeals denied the
defendant's motion to suppress the firearm, stating that "once the
arrested person is taken to the place of detention a full inventory
search is merited for his protection and that of his property, as well as
for the safety of his custodians and fellow-prisoners." 09 However,




105 See People v. Troiano, 323 N.E.2d 183, 185 (N.Y. 1974).
'0 Id at 183.
107 Id. at 184.
108 Id
' Id. at 185 (citing People v. Perel, 315 N.E.2d 452, 456 (N.Y. 1974)).
598 [Vol. 27
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the court recognized that "There is, perhaps, an area of traffic
violation 'arrest' where a full-blown search is not justified, but it
might seem to be confined to a situation where an arrest was not
necessary because an alternative summons was available or because
the arrest was a suspect pretext."'' 0
In People v. Howell,"' the New York Court of Appeals
acknowledged and applied the exception set forth in Troiano."2 In
Howell, the defendant was arrested for reckless driving and a
subsequent search of his person revealed that he was carrying a
loaded revolver." 3 The court pointed out that there existed "no
testimony or finding as to what circumstances led the police officer"
to believe that "the defendant might be armed."ll 4  In granting the
defendant's motion to suppress the revolver, the court stated that "the
police conduct [] [fell] within [the Troiano] rule" since the arrest was
based on mere erratic driving by the defendant."' 5  An arrest under
these circumstances "was neither called for nor the preferred
procedure."16
More recently, the appellate division invalidated a search
Ito Troiano, 323 N.E.2d at 185. Judge Rabin, in his concurring opinion, distinguished
Troiano from Marsh, stating: "The warrant authorized Marsh's arrest for speeding, a traffic
infraction not a crime, and since there was no reason for the arresting officer to fear an
assault, or probable cause to believe Marsh had committed a crime, no search for a weapon
was authorized." Id. at 186 (Rabin, J., concurring) (citing People v. Coleman, 250 N.E.2d
237, 237 (N.Y. 1969)). Troiano, on the other hand, "was arrested on a misdemeanor
violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and not for a mere infraction." Id. ("Although the
nature of the offense itself does not raise the likelihood of violence, the fact that it is in the
misdemeanor category separates and distinguishes it from a very great number of traffic
infractions committed by virtually everyone who ventures outdoors."). Moreover, "the
search in [Troiano] is distinguishable from that in Marsh in that the extent of the search
necessary to uncover the weapon was entirely consonant with its purpose of securing the
officer's safety and preventing an escape." Id
Had Marsh been taken into custody for a misdemeanor traffic offense, a
frisk appropriate to the discovery of weapons would have been
authorized[;] [however] [i]t is doubtful that this rationale would
authorize the removal of the book of matches from Marsh's pocket, and
it is certain that a search for weapons supplies no reason for opening the
match cover and seizing the paper enclosed within it.
Id.
"' 403 N.E.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. 1980).
112 Id. at 183.
113 Id. at 182-83.
114 Id. at 183.
us Id. at 182-83.
116 Howell, 403 N.E.2d at 182 (internal citations omitted).
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following a stop for a traffic infraction." 7 In People v. Barreras,"
the defendant was convicted of "criminal possession of a controlled
substance" after he was pulled over for failing to stop at a stop
sign." 9 After being pulled over, the defendant produced a valid
license, registration, and insurance documents.120 Nonetheless, the
officer, "without advising defendant that he could refuse the request,
then asked the defendant if he would 'mind' if the officer looked
through the car."l21 Wile searching the defendant's car, the officer
found what he believed to be cocaine and marijuana.122  The
defendant was subsequently arrested and taken to the precinct, where
he was issued a summons for the traffic violation.123  Finding that
"[o]nce defendant's papers were all found to be in order, the officers,
without more, were obligated to issue the stop-sign summons and
allow defendant to resume his journey[,]" the court granted the
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of
the search of his vehicle.124
In a civil case brought against New York City, the court was
presented with the issue of whether a police officer is required to
issue a summons when a traffic law has been violated.125 In Santiago
v. City of New York,126 the plaintiff was stopped, arrested, and
charged with "speeding, interfering with the safe operation of other
vehicles, and following too closely." 27  The defendant moved to
dismiss the plaintiffs claims, arguing that "the plaintiff was properly
stopped, detained, arrested and prosecuted for the traffic
infractions." 28  The court denied the defendant's motion and, in
making its determination, recognized that
117 See People v. Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1998).
118 Id. at 526.
"9 Id. at 527-28.
120 Id. at 528.
121 Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
122 id.
123 Id. at 528-29.
124 Id. at 529-30.
125 See Santiago v. City of New York, No. 7161/00, 2002 WL 484139, at *4 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Feb. 26, 2002) ("After a stop for a traffic offense committed [iln the officer's presence, is
a police officer obligated to merely issue a traffic summons and release the motorist, or does
said officer have an unfettered discretion to make an arrest?").
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An ever-growing body of persuasive commentary in
other decisions suggest that police officers do not,
absent some aggravating circumstance, have an
unfettered discretion to make a full custodial arrest for
a traffic offense and must instead merely issue a traffic
summons and allow the motorist to leave.129
Moreover, the court acknowledged that the "evolution of the
law" has "demonstrate[d] an increasing erosion of what initially
appears to be a clear and absolute statutory right of a police office[r]
to make a custodial arrest for a traffic infraction."' 3 1 In conclusion,
the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and held that the
police officers were required to issue a citation for any traffic
violations committed by Santiago. 131
Based on the above analysis of New York case law regarding
arrests and searches following traffic violations, it is clear that the
court in Abdul-Akim properly determined that the arrest for the cell
phone infraction and the subsequent search of the vehicle were
unlawful. At first glance, the holding in Abdul-Akim is contrary to
New York statutory law permitting arrests for traffic violations.
However, an evaluation of the current case law in New York plainly
demonstrates that an arrest based upon a mere traffic infraction is
disfavored and, more importantly, unconstitutional. Concluding that
the Legislature, in enacting the cell phone law, "could not have
thought it was giving police officers the right arbitrarily to arrest
drivers for such a violation, to seize their vehicles, and to conduct
intrusive searches," the court correctly suppressed the weapon
obtained as a result of the search.13 2
However, it is also equally clear that Ayala's arrest based
upon the traffic violation was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Federal case law has made it clear that a police officer can arrest an
individual for a traffic infraction without violating any constitutional
rights. It is important to note that the court in Abdul-Akim did not
129 Id. at * ll (emphasis in original).
130 Santiago, 2002 WL 484139, at * 12. The court noted that this case did not involve "a
search incident to an arrest[,]" but, nevertheless, analyzed cases concerning this particular
issue. See id. (emphasis in original).
"' Id. at *15.
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analyze the constitutionality of the inventory search following
Ayala's arrest for the traffic infraction under federal law. Rather, the
court stopped its analysis at Atwater and found it not to be controlling
authority. It seems reasonable to conclude that the inventory search
of Ayala's vehicle was constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.13 3 The court noted that "Both the manner of the search,
and the procedure through which a record of the seized property was
made, fully compl[ied] with the governing authority." 34 Therefore,
the police conduct in this case was lawful under federal law since an
arrest based upon a traffic violation is constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment and an inventory search of a vehicle in police custody is
an exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth
Amendment.
Nonetheless, as the court acknowledged, "New York State
courts are bound to exercise independent judgment in determining the
scope and effect of the rights guaranteed by the New York State
Constitution. Decisions of the Supreme Court limiting similar
guarantees in the Constitution of the United States do not bind New
York courts." 35
Clearly . . . [the New York] Court of Appeals
maintains a more protective view of an individual's
rights under our New York State Constitution as those
rights protect all citizens from being the subject of an
"unreasonable search and seizure" by the police
133 However, it can be argued that the police officers in Abdul-Akim acted unreasonably
when they impounded Ayala's car since there was a licensed driver present in the vehicle
who could have driven the car after Ayala was arrested. If it is determined that the decision
to impound was in fact unreasonable, the result may well be that Ayala's federal
constitutional rights were violated.
134 Id. (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1976). However, the
court did not speak at length about this issue since it ultimately granted the defendants'
motion. Id.
1' Id. at n.10 (citing People v. Alvarez, 515 N.E.2d 898, 899 (N.Y. 1987)). See also
People v. Bradford, No. 10-0023, 2010 WL 3170721, at *6 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. May 21, 2010).
[D]espite the Supreme Court rulings, state courts are free to protect the
privacy interests of their citizens by imposing higher standards on
searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution. Thus, a
state may choose to regulate arrests in a manner more restrictive than the
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following an arrest for a vehicle and traffic law
violation. 136
Based on this basic principle, the firearm was properly
suppressed as having been illegally obtained in violation of Ayala's
state constitutional rights.
Laura R. Bugdin*
116 Bradford, 2010 WL 3170721, at *6.
Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2012, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
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